After Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, the course of the Great Patriotic War was finally broken, the Red Army began to reclaim its land. World War II was drawing to a close. The liberation of Belarus was an important step on the path to victory.
Winter tryout
The first attempt to liberate Belarus was made in the winter of 1944. The offensive in the direction of Vitebsk began in early February, but it was not crowned with success: the advance was difficult, in a month and a half it was possible to deepen only ten kilometers.
The Belorussian Front, operating in the Minsk-Bobruisk direction, was doing somewhat better, but also far from brilliant. Here the offensive began even earlier, in early January, and already on the 14th Mozyr and Kalinkovichi were taken. By the beginning of spring, Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper and recaptured 20-25 km of territory from the Nazis.
Such a leisurely advance of the Red Army could not be considered particularly successful, so in the middle of spring the High Command decided to postpone the offensive. The troops were ordered to gain a foothold on the occupiedpositions and wait for better times.
Unlike the Belarusian direction, the large-scale campaign of the winter-spring of 1944 was quite successful: the southern edge of the front crossed the border, the battles were fought outside the USSR. Things were going well on the northern sector of the front: Soviet troops were able to get Finland out of the war. The liberation of Belarus, the B altic republics and the complete reconquest of Ukraine were planned for the summer.
Disposition
The front line in the BSSR was an arc (ledge, wedge) directed towards the Soviet Union with a length of 1100 km. In the north it was limited to Vitebsk, in the south - to Pinsk. Inside this arc, called the “Belarusian ledge” in the Soviet General Staff, German troops were stationed - the Center group, including the 3rd tank, 2nd, 4th and 9th armies.
The German command attached great strategic importance to its positions in Belarus. They were ordered to be protected at all costs, so the liberation of Belarus was not a cakewalk at all.
Moreover, in the spring of 1944, the Fuhrer did not at all consider the war lost, but flattered himself with hopes, believing that if time was delayed, the coalition would fall apart, and then the Soviet Union would surrender, exhausted by a long war.
After conducting a series of reconnaissance operations and analyzing the situation, the Wehrmacht decided that Ukraine and Romania should rather expect trouble: using the already reclaimed territory, the Red Army could deliver a crushing blow and even recapture the strategically important Ploiesti deposits from Germany.
Guided by these considerations, the Nazis pulled the main forces to the south, believing that the liberation of Belarus was unlikely to begin so soon: neither the state of the enemy’s forces nor local conditions were in the least conducive to an offensive.
Military stratagem
USSR carefully supported these false beliefs in the enemy. False defensive lines were built in the central sector, the 3rd Ukrainian Front intensively imitated the movement of a dozen rifle divisions, the illusion was created that the tank formations stationed in Ukraine remained in place, while in fact they were hastily transferred to the central part of the offensive line. Numerous deceptive manipulations were carried out, designed to falsely inform the enemy, and in the meantime, Operation Bagration was being prepared in the strictest secrecy: the liberation of Belarus was not far off.
May 20, the General Staff completed the planning of the campaign. As a result, the Soviet command expected to achieve the following goals:
- push the enemy away from Moscow;
- wedged between Nazi army groups and deprive them of communication with each other;
- provide a springboard for subsequent attacks on the enemy.
To achieve success, the Belarusian offensive operation was carefully planned, since a lot depended on its outcome: victory opened the way to Warsaw, and hence to Berlin. The struggle was to be serious, because in order to achieve the goals it was necessary:
- overcome a powerful enemy systemfortifications
- force large rivers;
- take strategic positions;
- to liberate Minsk from the Nazis as soon as possible.
Approved plan
On May 22 and 23, the plan was discussed with the participation of the front commanders who took part in the operation, and on May 30 it was finally approved. According to him, it was supposed:
- "hole through" the German defenses in six places, taking advantage of the surprise of the attack and the power of the strike;
- destroy the groups near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, which served as a kind of "wings" of the Belarusian ledge;
- after the breakthrough, move forward along a converging trajectory in order to encircle as large enemy forces as possible.
The successful implementation of the plan actually put an end to the forces of the Wehrmacht in this area and made possible the complete liberation of Belarus: 1944 was supposed to put an end to the torment of the population, who had drunk the horrors of the war to the full.
Main participants of events
The largest offensive operation involved the forces of the Dnieper military flotilla and four fronts: the 1st B altic and three Belorussian.
It is difficult to overestimate the huge role that partisan detachments played in the implementation of the operation: without their developed movement, the liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders would certainly have taken much more time and effort. During the so-called rail war, the partisans managed to blow up almost 150,000 rails. This, of course, greatly complicated the life of the invaders, andafter all, trains were still derailed, crossings were destroyed, communications were damaged, and many other daring acts of sabotage were committed. The partisan movement in Belarus was the most powerful in the USSR.
When the operation "Bagration" was being developed, the mission of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Rokossovsky was considered especially difficult. In the area of the Bobruisk direction, nature itself did not seem conducive to success - on this issue, the high command of both sides was completely unanimous. Indeed, attacking with tanks through impenetrable swamps is, to put it mildly, a difficult task. But the marshal insisted: the Germans did not expect an attack from this side, since they knew about the existence of marshes no worse than we do. That is why the blow must be struck from here.
Power balance
The fronts participating in the campaign have been significantly strengthened. The railway worked not for fear, but for conscience: in the course of preparation, a myriad of equipment and people were transported - and all this while observing the strictest secrecy.
Since the Germans decided to concentrate their forces in the southern sector, the German Army Group Center opposing the Red Army had several times fewer people. Against 36.4 thousand Soviet guns and mortars - 9.5 thousand, against 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns - 900 tanks and assault guns, against 5.3 thousand units of combat aircraft - 1350 aircraft.
The start time of the operation was kept in the strictest confidence. Until the very last moment, the Germans did nothad no idea about the impending campaign. One can imagine what a commotion arose when, in the early morning of June 23, Operation Bagration finally began.
Surprise for the Fuhrer
The advance of fronts and armies was not uniform. For example, the strike force of the 1st B altic (4th Army) was unable to crush the enemy with one violent onslaught. During the day of the operation, she was able to cover only 5 km. But fortune smiled on the Sixth Guards and Forty-third Armies: they "pierced" the enemy's defenses and bypassed Vitebsk from the north-west. The Germans hastily retreated, leaving about 15 km. Tanks of the 1st Corps immediately poured into the gap.
3rd Belorussian Front forces of the 39th and 5th armies bypassed Vitebsk from the south, practically did not notice the Luchesa River and continued the offensive. The boiler closed: on the very first day of the operation, the Germans had only one chance to avoid encirclement: a twenty-kilometer-wide "corridor" that did not last long, the trap slammed shut in the village of Ostrovno.
In the Orsha direction, the Soviet soldiers failed at first: the German defense in this sector was very powerful, the enemy defended himself desperately, evilly and competently. Attempts to free Orsha were made as early as January and failed. In winter, the battle was lost, but the war was not lost: Operation Bagration left no room for failure.
The 11th and 31st armies spent the whole day trying to break through to the second line of German defense. Meanwhile, the 5th Panzer Army was waiting in the wings: in the event of a successful breakthrough in Orshain the direction she opened the way to Minsk.
The 2nd Belorussian Front advanced smoothly and successfully on Mogilev. By the end of the first day of fighting as part of the campaign on the banks of the Dnieper, a good bridgehead was captured.
On June 24, the operation to liberate Belarus began for the 1st Belorussian Front, which began to fulfill its own combat mission: to move in the Bobruisk direction. Here the hopes for a surprise attack were fully justified: still, the Germans did not expect trouble from this side. Their line of defense was scattered and small.
In the area of Parichi, only one strike group broke through for 20 km - the tanks of the First Guards Corps immediately crawled into the gap. The Germans retreated to Bobruisk. Pursuing them, the vanguard was already on the outskirts of the city on June 25.
In the Rogachev area, things were not so rosy at first: the enemy fiercely resisted, but when the direction of the blow was deflected to the north, things got more fun. On the third day after the start of the Soviet operation, the Germans realized that it was time to save themselves, but they were too late: the Soviet tanks were already deep behind enemy lines. On June 27, the trap slammed shut. It contained more than six enemy divisions, which were completely destroyed two days later.
Success
The offensive was swift. On June 26, the Red Army liberated Vitebsk, on the 27th, after fierce fighting, the Nazis nevertheless left Orshansk, on the 28th, Soviet tanks were already in Borisov, which was completely cleared on July 1.
Near Minsk, Vitebsk andBobruisk killed 30 enemy divisions. 12 days after the start of the operation, Soviet troops advanced 225-280 km, breaking half of Belarus in one jerk.
The Wehrmacht turned out to be completely unprepared for such a development of events, and the command of the Army Group Center itself was grossly and systematically mistaken. Time was counted by hours, and sometimes by minutes. At first, it was still possible to avoid the encirclement by retreating in time to the river. Berezina and creating a new line of defense here. It is unlikely that in this case the liberation of Belarus would have been carried out in two months. But Field Marshal Bush did not give the order in time. Either his faith in the infallibility of Hitler's military calculations was so strong, or the commander underestimated the strength of the enemy, but he fanatically carried out Hitler's order to "defend the Belarusian ledge at any cost" and ruined his troops. 40 thousand soldiers and officers, as well as 11 German generals who held high posts, were captured. The result is, frankly, shameful.
Shocked by the successes of the enemy, the Germans began feverishly to correct the situation: Bush was removed from his post, additional formations began to be sent to Belarus. Seeing the trends, the Soviet command demanded to speed up the offensive and take Minsk no later than July 8th. The plan was overfulfilled: on the 3rd, the capital of the republic was liberated, and large German forces (105 thousand soldiers and officers) east of the city were surrounded. The last country that many of them saw in their lives was Belarus. 1944 was gathering its bloody harvest: 70 thousand people were killed and about 35 thousand had to pass through the streets of the jubilantSoviet capital. The front of the enemy was gaping with holes, and there was nothing to eliminate the huge 400-kilometer gap that had formed. The Germans took to flight.
Two-step operation
Operation "Bagration" consisted of two stages. The first one started on June 23rd. At this time, it was necessary to break through the strategic front of the enemy, to destroy the flank forces of the Belarusian salient. The blows of the fronts were supposed to gradually converge and concentrate at one point on the map. After achieving success, the tasks changed: it was necessary to urgently ensure the pursuit of the enemy and the expansion of the breakthrough line. On July 4, the USSR General Staff changed the original plan, thus completing the first stage of the campaign.
Instead of converging trajectories, divergent ones were coming: the 1st B altic Front moved in the direction of Siauliai, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to liberate Vilnius and Lida, the 2nd Belorussian Front was to move Novogrudok, Grodno and Bialystok. Rokossovsky went in the direction of Baranovichi and Brest, and having taken the latter, went to Lublin.
The second stage of Operation Bagration began on July 5th. The Soviet troops continued their rapid advance. By mid-summer, the vanguards of the fronts began to force the Neman. Large bridgeheads were captured on the Vistula and the river. Narew. On July 16, the Red Army occupied Grodno, and on July 28 - Brest.
August 29, the operation was completed. There were new steps to Victory.
Strategic value
Bagration is one of the largest strategic offensive campaigns in its scope. In just 68 daysBelarus was liberated. 1944, indeed, put an end to the occupation of the republic. The B altic territories were partially recaptured, Soviet troops crossed the border and partially occupied Poland.
The defeat of the powerful Army Group Center was a great military and strategic success. 3 brigades and 17 enemy divisions were completely destroyed. 50 divisions lost more than half of their strength. Soviet troops reached East Prussia, an extremely important German outpost.
The outcome of the operation contributed to the successful offensive in other directions, as well as the opening of a second front.
During the operation, the loss of the Germans amounted to about half a million people (killed, wounded and captured). The USSR also suffered serious losses in the amount of 765,815 people (178,507 killed, 587,308 wounded). Soviet soldiers showed miracles of heroism in order for the liberation of Belarus to take place. The year of the operation, however, like the entire period of the Patriotic War, was a time of true national feat. There are many memorials and monuments on the territory of the republic. The Mound of Glory was erected on the 21st kilometer of the Moscow Highway. The monument crowning the mound is four bayonets, symbolizing the four fronts that carried out the campaign.
The significance of this local victory was so great that the Soviet government was going to establish a medal for the liberation of Belarus, but later this did not happen. Some sketches of the award are stored in the Minsk Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War.
