Fans of military history are familiar with the Soviet T-70 tank designed by Nikolai Alexandrovich Astrov.
The characteristics of this combat vehicle immediately speak for themselves: this combat vehicle of the battlefield belongs to the light type.
The depressing fact prompted the military to create a new tank: combat tests of light and medium tanks of the Red Army (models from T-38 to T-60) during the first year of the Second World War revealed their non-competitiveness.
In January 1942, the 70th tank was demonstrated to Stalin as a reinforced version of the previous representative of the T-60 light tank line, and its serial production began in March.
Brief performance characteristics of the T-70 light tank
Let's consider the main characteristics of Astrov's brainchild:
- frontal armor thickness: bottom - 45 mm; top - 35 mm;
- side armor thickness - 15 mm;
- main armament: 20-K cannon, 45 mm caliber, (previously used in the T-50 tank);
- ammunition - 90 rounds;
- machine gun 7, 62 mm, 15 discs with 945 rounds;
- two four-strokesix-cylinder petrol engines with a capacity of 70 liters. p.;
- cross-country speed - up to 25 km/h, on the highway - 42 km/h;
- cruising range cross-country - 360 km, on the highway - 450 km;
- on the command vehicle - radio 12T or 9R.
The T-70 tank project was initially critical
T-70 - a tank of the Great Patriotic War, reviews of which are quite contradictory. And this - despite the fact that the number of such manufactured tanks (almost 8, 5 thousand units) was second only to the famous T-34! An objective look at its advantages and disadvantages reveals the main reason for this historical and technical incident. It is banal: often a failed project is initiated and promoted not by end users (in this case, the military), but by the top party leadership.
The initial pre-war thesis of the development of armored forces - "The army needs a good light tank!" - turned out to be wrong. The strategists did not take into account the prospect of arming the Wehrmacht (and this happened in 1942) with artillery of 50 and 75 mm caliber. Reinforced enemy guns effectively hit the T-70 from any angle. The tank was inferior to the German "tigers" and "panthers" with 75-caliber guns both in terms of firepower and armor protection. The commander of the Fifth Tank Army Katukov M. E. wrote unflatteringly about them to G. K. Zhukov, pointing out the impossibility of using the T-70 in an oncoming tank battle due to pre-guaranteed losses.
Wrong design direction?
Really, Russian WWII tanksat first they were created in a banal way by improving the previous model, without predicting, based on intelligence, the weapons of the battlefield created by the enemies. Based on the foregoing, unflattering reviews about the imperfection of the T-70 seem natural. Just improving the T-60 tank was not enough. Now, after more than 70 years since the implementation of the project of this weapon, we can already justify the dead end of such motivation.
Light tanks (photos of them are proof of this) would be ideal on the fronts of the First World War. It was for the guns of that time that the armor of the Astrov tank was practically impenetrable. The second important trump card was the speed and maneuverability of the T-70.
In other words, the need for the production of light tanks for the army in the middle of the 20th century was a fantasy of Soviet strategists of that time, who had not grown either tactically or strategically since the civil war. Customers of weapons should think adequately to their contemporary military thought!
Identified flaws in the design of the T-70 - an indicator of its failure?
Such shortcomings were characteristic of almost all light tanks of that time, therefore, looking ahead, we state the fact: none of them became really effective on the battlefield.
All light Russian tanks of the Second World War were designed to order by the leading designer Astrov Nikolai Alexandrovich, like the T-70. Tests of new weapons, carried out in 1941, revealed areas for improving the tank:
- armor boost;
- replacement of a single cast towerdouble hex;
- strengthening of transmission, tracks, suspension torsion bars, road wheels tires;
- replacement of the main gun with a more modern one (the latter was never implemented).
What can I say? Were there too many flaws in the base model? Is it really just such a basic model that was in demand by the Red Army?
The further evolution of tank building proved the inappropriateness of light tanks on the battlefield: the armies of different countries gradually abandoned such weapons on the battlefield in principle. Instead, other light armored vehicles have been developed, mainly performing the role of support, which no longer act as the main fire armored force of the battlefield. However, on the other hand, the very process of creating and modifying the T-70 turned out to be very creative.
Serial types
Industrial production of T-70 light tanks was carried out in a variant corresponding to the original design of the designer Astrov, as well as in a modified version of the T-70M.
The first variety had unreinforced armor, lighter weight - 9.2 tons and more ammunition - 90 shells; the second - greater weight (9, 8 tons), achieved through additional armor, strengthening units and parts. The ammo capacity of the upgraded tank has been reduced to 70 rounds.
In fact, these were structurally different combat vehicles with different, non-interchangeable parts.
Kursk Bulge is a fiasco for the T-70 light tank
In reality, the army needed medium and heavy tanks capable ofeffectively hit enemy armored vehicles.
The party bosses did not hear the dishonorably repressed and shot in the basement of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Soviet Court Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky: "The future war will be a war of tank formations!"
And, accordingly, the defense industry of the USSR since 1942 mass-produced the T-70 - a tank whose combat potential in 1943 did not stand the severe test - an uncompromising oncoming tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (the Battle of Kursk).
Armor did not save: 75th and 50th caliber enemy artillery easily penetrated even its frontal part. Moreover, the tank turned out to be vulnerable even to outdated German regimental artillery of 37 mm caliber. The exam was failed by an oncoming tank battle and, accordingly, after the Kursk Bulge, the mass production of the T-70 was stopped.
However, oddly enough, it was at the second stage of the Great Patriotic War, when the Red Army was advancing uncontrollably, that a number of qualified combat commanders expressed regret at the premature farewell to the T-70. The tank still, despite the obvious shortcomings, was useful!
On the positive combat qualities of the T-70
It was not given to reveal his positive to new tankers. At the same time, aces of tank combat in rough and wooded terrain even preferred this light vehicle to the more armored medium T-34. What motivated them to make this choice? Firstly, German heavy guns and heavy tanks almost equally hit the T-34 and T-70. Moreover, due to the smallerthe size of a light tank, aimed fire at it is possible from a distance of half a kilometer, while at the T-34 - from a kilometer distance.
Also, with the help of the T-70, it was possible to use the surprise factor when attacking the enemy. At the same time, both the heavy tank IS and the medium T-34 were deprived of this possibility due to noisier diesel engines.
Almost close, unnoticed, a T-70 light tank was driving across rough terrain to the enemy camp. After all, the noise of the twin gasoline car engine with a capacity of 140 liters. with. the sound level resembled only a passenger car. Lieutenant General Bogdanov reported to the Main Armored Directorate that the T-70, due to its low noise, ideally performed the function of pursuing a retreating enemy.
The location of the fuel tanks in the rear of the hull contributed to the extremely rare detonation of fuel when it hit the tank.
In 1944, when about one and a half thousand T-70 tanks remained in the tank units of the Red Army, the OGK of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry stated its effectiveness in urban battles. "Seventy" was difficult to hit with "faustpatrons" and grenades due to its small size and high maneuverability.
Manufacturability
It should be recognized that the Soviet T-70 tank in its design turned out to be one of the most technologically efficient. For its manufacture, a thoroughly balanced production base of the GAZ plant was used. Efficiently established cooperation with the factories-suppliers of components anddetails.
Effectively organized repair of weapons on the basis of the T-70, damaged at the front.
Initially, the designer Astrov set up its production at the Gorky Automobile Plant.
In 1942, the factory workers produced 3495 units of this weapon, and in 1943 - 3348. Then the production of the T-70 in 1942 was also debugged at factory No. 38 (Kirov). 1378 of these tanks were made here.
It was also planned to involve the Sverdlovsk Plant No. 37 in the production of the tank. However, it was not prepared here, and technological costs turned out to be critically high. Twice as many engines were required as for the T-60, making more powerful rolled armor more labor intensive. The result is a modest result: 10 tanks and the cessation of production.
An objective look at the design flaws of the tank
The fact is obvious: the idea of an effective light tank on the fronts of World War II turned out to be a complete utopia. Therefore, work on the project to create the T-70 (despite the mass of original engineering discoveries, which we will write about later) obviously looked like Sisyphus' work, that is, it was doomed to failure.
Let's start with the fact that Soviet WWII tanks (including the subject of our description) had a layout design that was not without obvious flaws, involving 5 compartments:
- managerial;
- motor (on the right - in the middle of the body);
- combat (tower and left - in the middle of the hull);
- stern (where the gas tanks and radiator were located).
The tank with similar compartments was front-wheel drive,therefore, the undercarriage of its part was characterized by increased vulnerability.
T-70 - an exhibit of the armored museum in Kubinka (Moscow region)
It's no secret that light tanks (a photo of the Japanese "Ha-Go" and the German PzKpfw-II, modern with the T-70, is presented below) should be designed taking into account mutually exclusive technical and combat criteria:
- effective distribution of duties between crew members (functional overload of the tank commander in a crew of two, which also included the driver);
- the firepower of the gun was insufficient (the design of the light tank assumed a 45-mm rifled automatic gun 20-K model 1932 as the main armament).
Wishing to see the typical armament of the T-70 - the main gun and coaxial machine gun DT-29 caliber 7.62 mm - we recommend visiting the specialized military armored museum (Kubinka). Museum guests can see both the equipment and the equipment of the crew seats.
The tank commander was in the turret compartment, which is shifted to the left relative to the longitudinal axis, and also captures the left middle part of the hull. According to his duties, he directed the actions of the driver through intercom, monitored the situation, loaded and fired the weapon and the coaxial machine gun.
The driver was in front of the hull, in the middle.
Since the exhibits of the museum have been carefully restored and, as they say, are on the move,sightseers can see the operating components and assemblies of the T-70, making a visual impression for themselves. What do we mean when we mention the functional overload of the tank commander? Too many mechanical, routine processes in it were not automated. This shortcoming can be noticed by those who visited the museum (Kubinka). One has only to carefully examine the mechanisms of the restored combat vehicle. Judge for yourself:
- manual drive of the turret rotator;
- manual drive for gun hoist;
- when firing shells of fragmentation type, the semi-automatic did not work, and the commander was forced to manually open the shutter and pull out the red-hot spent cartridge case.
Due to these factors, objectively hindering the fight, the design rate of fire - up to 12 rounds per minute - turned out to be unattainable. In reality, the T-70 fired up to 5 shots per minute.
By the way, in the same museum, namely in pavilion No. 6, visitors will be able to see the tanks of fascist Germany: "tigers" and "panthers", which opposed the Soviet tank we are considering.
Swiftly evolved, but still far from perfect, Soviet tanks from the Second World War invariably enjoy the attention of visitors.
Demanded undercarriage T-70
Specially for the T-70, a twin engine GAZ-203 was developed. Ahead is the GAZ-70-6004 engine, and behind is the GAZ-70-6005. Six-cylinder four-stroke engines - both have been derated for increased reliability and durability.
The T-70 transmission, inherited from the previous model, received generally positive reviews. It consisted of:
- double disc clutch;
- 4-speed gearbox;
- stepped type cardan shaft;
- bevel final drive;
- multi-plate friction clutches;
- single row final drives.
The T-70 caterpillar consisted of 91 tracks 26 cm wide.
Instead of a conclusion: military equipment based on the T-70
However, the T-70 was not a dead end model. The self-propelled artillery mount SU-76 was developed by the Design Bureau of Plant No. 38 (Kirov) on the basis of its extended undercarriage. The main armament of this self-propelled gun was the 76 mm ZIS-3 gun. The hull of the T-70 tank itself turned out to be technologically advanced and promising.
The design of the new weapons was dramatic. The first designer, Semyon Alexandrovich Ginzburg, was accused of non-existent "sins" after the depressing consequences of the Kusk Duga, deprived of the right to design, sent to the front, where he died. The commissar of tank construction I. M. Z altsman, who was in conflict with him, had a hand in this. However, this ambitious official was soon motivatedly dismissed from his post.
Vyacheslav Alexandrovich Malyshev, appointed to his position, appointed a competition for the modification of the SU-76, where representatives of GAZ and plant No. 38 were involved.
As a result, the self-propelled guns were reconfigured and put into mass production. The 75-mm gun made it possible to successfully destroy enemy self-propelled guns, light and medium tanks. She iswas also relatively effective against the heavy Panther, penetrating the gun mantlet and side armor. In the fight against the newer and more armored “Tiger”, the SU-76 turned out to be ineffective before the introduction of the HEAT and sub-caliber projectile.
In the second half of 1944, the ZSU-37 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, created on the basis of the chassis of the T-70 tank, entered service with the Red Army.
Today, amateur collectors have the opportunity to purchase any model of the T-70 tank. The price of the base model (full size) is 5 million rubles. Let's make a reservation that it is equipped with the original chassis, but, of course, it is not intended for combat. At the same time, the latest improvements are offered: from leather interior to echo sounder.
